

PUBLIC



**TrustFactory Client  
Root CA Certification  
Practice Statement**

**Date: 18 September 2023  
Version: 1.9**



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## References and Acknowledgements

1.	CA / Browser Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements	<a href="http://www.cabforum.org">http://www.cabforum.org</a>
2.	CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates	<a href="http://www.cabforum.org">http://www.cabforum.org</a>





## 1 Introduction

This Certification Practice Statement (CPS) applies to the products and services of TrustFactory Client Root Certification Authority (CA). The latest version may be found on the TrustFactory company repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

A CPS highlights the "procedures under which a Certificate is issued to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements". This CPS aims to adhere to the content and structure guidance provided in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 3647, dated November 2003. Where certain sections or topics of the RFC 3647 do not apply or requirements are not defined then the term 'No stipulation' is used.

TrustFactory CAs are governed by the TrustFactory Certificate Policy (CP) together with a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) applicable to the specific CA.

TrustFactory Client Root CA conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates published at <http://www.cabforum.org>. In the event of any inconsistency between this document and the Baseline Requirements, the Baseline Requirements take precedence over this document.

This CPS should be read together with the TrustFactory Certificate Policy. Certain practices, controls, compliance, business and legal matters that are common across all TrustFactory CAs are documented in the TrustFactory CP. This CPS addresses the specific technical and procedural practices of the TrustFactory Client Root CA, within the TrustFactory PKI System, which issue Certificates to Issuing CAs.

### 1.1 Overview

This CPS applies to the following Certification Authorities managed by TrustFactory:

- TrustFactory Client Root CA

The purpose of this CPS is to present the TrustFactory Client Root CA practices and procedures in managing Root CA Certificates and to demonstrate compliance with requirements pertaining to the issuance of Certificates according to TrustFactory Certificate Policy (CP).

The Certificate subject names addressed in this CPS are the following:

CN = TrustFactory Client Root Certificate Authority  
OU = TrustFactory PKI Operations  
O = TrustFactory(Pty)Ltd  
L = Johannesburg  
S = Gauteng  
C = ZA

### 1.2 Document Name and Identification

This document is the TrustFactory Client Root CA Certification Practice Statement (TrustFactory Client Root CA CPS).

The OID for TrustFactory is:

{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) trustfactory(50318) }

TrustFactory organizes its OID arcs for its CP and CPS documents as follows:

1.3.6.1.4.1.50318.1	TrustFactory CA CP
1.3.6.1.4.1. 50318.2.2	TrustFactory Client Root CA Certificates Practice Statement
1.3.6.1.4.1. 50318.2.4	TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificates Practice Statement

All TrustFactory CP and CPS documents are published in the Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.



### 1.2.1 Document Revisions

Version	Description	Date
1.0	Initial for review	6 October 2017
1.1	Error corrections Added certificate serial numbers and certificate profiles.	7 December 2017
1.2	Updates to Section 9.1 Fees Other minor corrections	15 December 2017
1.3	Key changes as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>PA must approve revocation: 4.9.3</li><li>SAAA notification for significant CPS amendments: 9.12</li></ul> Other minor corrections to improve clarity and understanding	8 August 2018
1.4	Updates to incorporate latest CAB Forum changes on revocation requirements, and other minor corrections and clarifications.	21 November 2018
1.5	Corrected and clarified the procedure for re-key/reissue: 3.4, 4.7 Minor corrections and changes to wording to be consistent with the CP	26 March 2019
1.6	Webtrust v2.2 and Webtrust SSL v2.4.1 changes in all documents Mozilla Root policy v2.7 changes in all documents	31 March 2020
1.7	Updated to incorporate details as required by Mozilla Root Store Policy. Removed use of “no stipulation”. Aligned subsection heading to RFC3647 / CAB Forum Baseline Requirements	12 July 2021
1.8	Reviewed and no changes made	11 July 2022
1.9	Reviewed and no changes made	18 September 2023

## 1.3 PKI Participants

### 1.3.1 TrustFactory Root Certification Authorities

TrustFactory Client Root Certification Authority is the root CA of a trust hierarchy that incorporates a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA which offers end-entity client certificates with the following hierarchy:

TrustFactory Client Root Certificate Authority

- └ TrustFactory Client Issuing Certificate Authority
  - PersonalPass Certificates
  - PersonalPass Premium Certificates
  - EmailPass Certificates

The TrustFactory Client Root CA may:

- Accept the Certificate Signing Requests (“CSR”) with the public keys of a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA which has been approved by the TrustFactory Policy Authority and whose identity and verified information to be contained in the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate have been established through a formal key ceremony.
- Create the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate containing the signed public key, once the CSR is verified by the TrustFactory Client Root CA.

### 1.3.2 Registration Authorities

TrustFactory Client Root CA will act as its own Registration Authority responsible for:

- Accepting, evaluating, approving or rejecting the registration of a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate application;
- Issuance of a Certificate in accordance with the provisions of the TrustFactory Client Root CA CPS; and
- Initiating the process to revoke a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate.

### 1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers are TrustFactory Client Issuing CAs that have been issued a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate.



### 1.3.4 Relying Parties

A Relying Party is a subordinate CA, person, entity, or organization that relies on or uses the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate and/or any other information provided in the TrustFactory repository to verify the identity and public key of a Subscriber.

### 1.3.5 Other Participants

The CAs and RAs operating under the TrustFactory CP may require the services of other security, community, and application authorities.

## 1.4 Certificate Usage

### 1.4.1 Appropriate certificate usage

TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificates may be used for the following purposes:

- Validating Certificates issued by the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA
- Validating Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) issued by the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA
- Validating OCSP responder certificates signed by the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA

Key Usage and extended key usage parameters are defined as per the profiles in Annexure A.

### 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate usage

Certificate use is restricted by using Certificate extensions on key usage and extended key usage.

Any usage not defined in the certificate profiles, as per Annexure A, above shall be deemed prohibited usage.

Any usage of the Certificate inconsistent with these extensions is not authorized. Certificates are not authorized for use for any transactions above the designated reliance limits that have been indicated in the TrustFactory Warranty Policy.

Certificates issued under this CPS may not be used:

- for any application requiring fail safe performance such as:
  - the operation of nuclear power facilities,
  - air traffic control systems,
  - aircraft navigation systems,
  - weapons control systems, and
  - any other system whose failure could lead to injury, death or environmental damage; or
- where prohibited by law.

## 1.5 Policy Administration

### 1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

Any enquiry associated with this CPS should be addressed to:

TrustFactory Policy Authority  
6<sup>th</sup> Floor, Firestation Rosebank  
16 Baker Street  
Rosebank  
Gauteng, 2196  
Republic of South Africa

Telephone: +27 11 880-6103  
Fax: +27 11 880-5443  
Email: info@trustfactory.net

### 1.5.2 Contact Person



TrustFactory General Manager  
6<sup>th</sup> Floor, Firestation Rosebank  
16 Baker Street  
Rosebank  
Gauteng, 2196  
Republic of South Africa

Telephone: +27 11 880-6103  
Fax: +27 11 880-5443  
Email: info@trustfactory.net

Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties can report suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates, through the “Report Abuse” link on the TrustFactory website at <https://www.trustfactory.net>.

Policy A

### 1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The TrustFactory Policy Authority determines the suitability and applicability of this CPS and the conformance of this CPS to the TrustFactory CP based on the results and recommendations received from a Qualified Auditor.

### 1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures

The TrustFactory Policy Authority reviews and approves any changes to this CPS. The updated CPS is reviewed against the CP in order to check for consistency. CP changes are also added on as needed basis. Upon approval of a CPS update by the Policy Authority, the new CPS is published in the TrustFactory Client Root CA Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

The updated version is binding upon all Subscribers, for all Certificates that have been issued or are to be issued, including the Subscribers and parties relying on Certificates that have been issued under a previous version of the CPS.

## 1.6 Definitions and acronyms

### 1.6.1 Definitions

Any terms used but not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the CA Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.

Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL)	A document signing certificate authority trust store created by the Adobe Root CA policy authority implemented from Adobe PDF Reader version 9.0
Advanced Electronic Signature (AES)	A specific digital signature that complies with the requirements of the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 2002 in the Republic of South Africa, and can be relied upon as evidence in a court of law.
Affiliate	A corporation, partnership, joint venture or other entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with another entity, or an agency, department, political subdivision, or any entity operating under the direct control of a Government Entity.
Applicant	The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Legal Entity is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the Applicant is the entity that controls or operates the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual Certificate Request.
Applicant Representative	A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant:



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(i) who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or</li><li>(ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or</li><li>(iii) who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.</li></ul>
Application Software Supplier	A supplier of Internet browser software or other Relying Party application software that displays or uses Certificates and incorporates Root Certificates.
Attestation Letter	A letter attesting that Subject Identity Information is correct, written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information.
Business Entity	Any entity that is not a Private Organization, Government Entity, or non-commercial entity. Examples include, but are not limited to, general partnerships, unincorporated associations, sole proprietorships, etc.
CDS (Certified Document Services)	A document signing architecture created by the Adobe Root CA policy authority implemented from Adobe PDF Reader version 6.0.
Certificate	An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a Public Key and an identity.
Certificate Beneficiaries	The Subscriber that is a party to the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use for the Certificate, all Application Software Suppliers with whom TrustFactory CA has entered into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Supplier, and all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on a Valid Certificate.
Certificate Data	Certificate Requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant or otherwise) in the CA's possession or control or to which the CA has access.
Certificate Management Process	Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, and hardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a Repository, and revokes Certificates.
Certificate Policy	A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.
Certificate Problem Report	A complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.
Certificate Request	Communications described in Section 10 of the Baseline Requirements requesting the issuance of a Certificate.
Certificate Revocation List	A regularly updated timestamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.
Certification Authority (CA)	An organization that is responsible for the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Certificates. The term applies equally to both Roots CAs and Subordinate CAs.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)	One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.
Certificate Signing Request (CSR)	A message or data sent to a CA or RA to request the issuance of a certificate.



Compromise	A violation of a security policy that results in loss of control over sensitive information.
Country	Either a member of the United Nations or a geographic region recognized as a sovereign nation by at least two UN member nations.
Cross Certificate	A Certificate that is used to establish a trust relationship between two Root CAs.
Digital Signature	To encode a message by using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash function such that a person having the initial message and the signer's Public Key can accurately determine whether the transformation was created using the Private Key that corresponds to the signer's Public Key and whether the initial message has been altered since the transformation was made.
Domain Name	The label assigned to a node in the Domain Name System.
Domain Name System (DNS)	An Internet service that translates Domain Names into IP addresses.
Domain Namespace	The set of all possible Domain Names that are subordinate to a single node in the Domain Name System.
Domain Name Registrant	Sometimes referred to as the "owner" of a Domain Name, but more properly the person(s) or entity(ies) registered with a Domain Name Registrar as having the right to control how a Domain Name is used, such as the natural person or Legal Entity that is listed as the "Registrant" by WHOIS or the Domain Name Registrar.
Domain Name Registrar	A person or entity that registers Domain Names under the auspices of or by agreement with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(i) the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),</li><li>(ii) a national Domain Name authority/registry, or</li><li>(iii) a Network Information Center (including their affiliates, contractors, delegates, successors, or assigns).</li></ul>
ECT Act	The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of the Government of South Africa.
Enterprise RA	An employee or agent of an organization unaffiliated with the CA who authorizes issuance of Certificates to that organization or its subsidiaries. An Enterprise RA may also authorize issuance of client authentication Certificates to partners, customers, or affiliates wishing to interact with that organization.
Expiry Date	The "Not After" date in a Certificate that defines the end of a Certificate's Validity Period.
Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)	A Domain Name that includes the labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System.
Government Entity	A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similar element of the government of a Country, or political subdivision within such Country (such as a state, province, city, county etc.).
Hash	An algorithm that maps or translates one set of bits into another (generally smaller) set in such a way that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ A message yields the same result every time the algorithm is executed using the same message as input.</li><li>▪ It is computationally infeasible for a message to be derived or reconstituted from the result produced by the algorithm.</li><li>▪ It is computationally infeasible to find two different messages that produce the same hash result using the same algorithm.</li></ul>



Hardware Security Module (HSM)	A HSM is type of secure crypto processor targeted at managing digital keys, accelerating crypto processes in terms of digital signings/second and for providing strong authentication to access critical keys for server applications.
Internal Server Name	A server name (which may or may not include an Unregistered Domain Name) that is not resolvable using the public DNS.
Incorporate by Reference	To make one document a part of another by identifying the document to be incorporated, with information that allows the recipient to access and obtain the incorporated message in its entirety, and by expressing the intention that it be part of the incorporating message. Such an incorporated message shall have the same effect as if it had been fully stated in the message.
Incorporating Agency	In the context of a Private Organization, the government agency in the Jurisdiction of Incorporation under whose authority the legal existence of the entity is registered (e.g., the government agency that issues certificates of formation or incorporation). In the context of a Government Entity, the entity that enacts law, regulations, or decrees establishing the legal existence of Government Entities.
Individual	A natural person.
Issuing CA	In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.
Jurisdiction of Incorporation	In the context of a Private Organization, the country and (where applicable) the state or province or locality where the organization's legal existence was established by a filing with (or an act of) an appropriate government agency or entity (e.g., where it was incorporated). In the context of a Government Entity, the country and (where applicable) the state or province where the Entity's legal existence was created by law.
Key Compromise	A Private Key is said to be Compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person has had access to it.
Key Pair	The Private Key and its associated Public Key.
Legal Entity	An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity or other entity with legal standing in a Country's legal system.
Object Identifier (OID)	A unique alphanumeric or numeric identifier registered under the International Organization for Standardization's applicable standard for a specific object or object class.
OCSP Responder	An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.
Online Certificate Protocol (OCSP) Status	An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables Relying Party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.
Place of Business	The location of any facility (such as an office, factory, retail store, warehouse, etc.) where the Applicant's business is conducted.
Private Key	The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.
Private Organization	A non-governmental legal entity (whether ownership interests are privately held or publicly traded) whose existence was created by a filing with (or an act of) the Incorporating Agency or equivalent in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation.



Public Key	The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)	A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key cryptography.
Publicly-Trusted Certificate	A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.
Qualified Auditor	A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of Section 8.2 (Identity/ Qualifications of Assessor).
Qualified Government Information Source	A database maintained by a Government Entity.
Qualified Government Tax Information Source	A Qualified Governmental Information Source that specifically contains tax information relating to Private Organizations, Business Entities, or Individuals.
Qualified Independent Information Source	A regularly-updated and current, publicly available, database designed for the purpose of accurately providing the information for which it is consulted, and which is generally recognized as a dependable source of such information.
Registered Domain Name	A Domain Name that has been registered with a Domain Name Registrar.
Registration Authority (RA)	Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of Subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may assist in the Certificate application process or revocation process or both. When "RA" is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA.
Relying Party	Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.
Repository	An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response. ( <a href="https://www.trustfactory.net/repository">https://www.trustfactory.net/repository</a> ).
Root CA	The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.
Root Certificate	The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.
Subject	The natural person, device, system, unit, or Legal Entity identified in a Certificate as the Subject. The Subject is either the Subscriber or a device under the control and operation of the Subscriber.
Subject Identity Information	Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a Domain Name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the commonName field.





Subordinate CA	A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA.
Subscriber	A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.
Subscriber Agreement	An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.
Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate	A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.
Terms of Use	Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of the CA.
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)	A hardware cryptographic device which is defined by the Trusted Computing Group. <a href="https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TPM">https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TPM</a> .
Trustworthy System	Computer hardware, software, and procedures that are: reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions; and enforce the applicable security policy.
Unregistered Domain Name	A Domain Name that is not a Registered Domain Name.
Validation Specialists	Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by these Requirements.
Validity Period	The period of time measured from the date when the Certificate is issued until the Expiry Date.
Valid Certificate	A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.
Validity Period	The period of time measured from the date when the Certificate is issued until the Expiry Date.
Vetting Agent	Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by these Requirements.
WebTrust Program for CAs	The then-current version of the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities.
WebTrust Seal of Assurance	An affirmation of compliance resulting from the WebTrust Program for CAs.
WHOIS	Information retrieved directly from the Domain Name Registrar or registry operator via the protocol defined in RFC 3912, the Registry Data Access Protocol defined in RFC 7482, or an HTTPS website.
Wildcard Certificate	A Certificate containing an asterisk (*) in the left-most position of any of the Subject Fully-Qualified Domain Names contained in the Certificate.
X.509	The standard of the ITU-T (International Telecommunications Union-T) for Certificates.



## 1.6.2 Acronyms

AATL	Adobe Approved Trust List
AES	Advanced Electronic Signature
AICPA	American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
API	Application Programming Interface
AOR	Authorized Organizational Representative
BR	CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements
CA	Certification Authority
ccTLD	Country Code Top-Level Domain
CICA	Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DNS	Domain Name System
DV	Domain Validation
EKU	Extended Key Usage
ERA	Enterprise Registration Authority
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EV	Extended Validation
FIPS	(US Government) Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
GST	General Sales Tax
IANA	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ID	Identity document
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
NIST	(US Government) National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
OV	Organization Validation
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
QGIS	Qualified Government Information Source
QGTIS	Qualified Government Tax Information Source
QIIS	Qualified Independent Information Source
PA	Policy Authority
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request for Comments
SAAA	South African Accreditation Authority
S/MIME	Secure MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLD	Top-Level Domain
TLS	Transport Layer Security
VAT	Value Added Tax



## 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

### 2.1 Repositories

TrustFactory Client Root CA publishes all CA Certificates, revocation data for issued Certificates, CP, CPS, and Relying Party agreements and Subscriber Agreements in Repositories at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

TrustFactory Client Root CA may publish submitted information on publicly accessible directories for the provision of Certificate status information.

TrustFactory Client Root CA does not make certain classified and confidential documentation including business controls, operating procedures, security policies, processes and standards, and business continuity and recovery plans available to the public. These documents are, however, made available to Qualified Auditors as required during any WebTrust or SAAA audit performed on TrustFactory Client Root CA.

### 2.2 Publication of Certificate Information

TrustFactory Client Root CA publishes its CA Certificates, CP, CPS, and agreements at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

CRLs are published in online repositories. The CRLs contain entries for all revoked unexpired Certificates with a validity period that depends on Certificate type and/or position of the Certificate within the Certificate chain.

The TrustFactory Client Root CA generates a Certificate Revocation List that is accessible through the web-interface at: <http://www.trustfactory.net/crl/tf-client-issuing.crl>.

The TrustFactory Client Root CA ensures that revocation data for issued Certificates and its Root Certificate are available through a Repository 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

### 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

The TrustFactory PA will annually review this CPS and may make revisions and updates to policies as required by changes in the Requirements, standards, laws and regulations or other circumstances. Any updates become binding for all Certificates that have been issued or are to be issued upon the date of the publication of the updated version of this CPS.

New or modified versions of the CP, this CPS, Subscriber Agreements, or Relying Party agreements are published within ten days after being approved and digitally signed by the TrustFactory PA.

### 2.4 Access controls on repositories

The repository is publicly accessible information with Read-only access for the public.

Access control policies are implemented to prevent unauthorized persons from adding, deleting, or modifying repository entries. TrustFactory ensures that the integrity and authenticity of its public documentation is maintained by digitally signing the Adobe PDF format of the documents.



### 3 Identification and Authentication

TrustFactory Client Root CA acts as its own RA for issuance of an Issuing CA Certificate.

#### 3.1 Naming

##### 3.1.1 Types of Names

TrustFactory Client Root CA Certificates follow the X.500 distinguished names rules to identify the Subject. Common Names (CNs) and are not misleading.

The common name is the name associated with TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate to be issued.

##### 3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The value of the common name attribute used is the name associated with the specific TrustFactory Issuing CA and should represent its specific purpose (e.g. SSL or Client).

##### 3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

Pseudonyms (names other than a subscriber's true organizational name) will not be permitted, except for the purposes of issuing certificates for testing or demonstration purposes.

##### 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished names in Certificates are interpreted using X.500 standards and ASN.1 syntax.

##### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

TrustFactory Client Root CA enforces the uniqueness of each Subject name in a Certificate Authority as follows:

- The combination of the Common Name and all the attributes of the Distinguished Name (DN), together with the certificate serial number provides a unique electronic identity for the Issuing CA.

##### 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

TrustFactory Client Root CA may not use registered trademarks that infringe on the intellectual property rights of a third party, when assigning the distinguished names to Issuing CA's.

#### 3.2 Initial Identity Validation

Not applicable since the same entity owns the TrustFactory Client Root CA and subsequent Client Issuing CAs. However, the TrustFactory PA will validate that requests for Issuing CA Certificates are only submitted by the authorized TrustFactory management personnel.

##### 3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

The Issuing CA should generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), in PKCS#10 format, signed with its Private Key and the TrustFactory Client Root CA will validate it with the Issuing CA's Public Key.

This requirement does not apply where a key pair is generated by the Root CA on behalf of the Issuing CA.

##### 3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

###### 3.2.2.1 Validation of Organization Identity

The TrustFactory PA will verify and validate all the information required in the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA certificate (since the Issuing CA is an Affiliate of the Root CA).



#### **3.2.2.2 Use of Tradename or DBA name**

If a DBA name is required, the TrustFactory PA will verify and validate all the information required in the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA certificate (since the Issuing CA is an Affiliate of the Root CA).

#### **3.2.2.3 Verification of Country**

The TrustFactory PA will verify and validate all the information required in the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA certificate (since the Issuing CA is an Affiliate of the Root CA).

#### **3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control**

Not applicable to the Root CA.

Client Issuing CA certificates will not contain a Domain Name in the subject.

#### **3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP Address**

TrustFactory does not permit listing IP Addresses in a Certificate.

#### **3.2.2.6 Wildcard Domain Validation**

Not applicable to the Root CA.

#### **3.2.2.7 Data Source Accuracy**

Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, the TrustFactory PA evaluates the source for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification.

#### **3.2.2.8 CAA Records**

Not applicable to the Root CA.

#### **3.2.3 Authentication of Individual identity**

Not applicable since the TrustFactory Client Root CA will not accept requests for individual certificates.

#### **3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information**

Subject Organizational Unit (OU) field in a Certificate is generally not verified except as required by industry standards or requirements.

#### **3.2.5 Validation of Authority**

The PA will validate that all requests related to Issuing CA Certificates, such as initial registration, renewal or revocation, are only submitted by the authorized TrustFactory management personnel.

#### **3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation**

Not applicable. TrustFactory Client Root CA has not established any cross-certificates.

### **3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests**

TrustFactory Client Root CA only permits re-key requests for Client Issuing CAs if the requests have been specifically authorized by the PA.

#### **3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key**

TrustFactory PA will validate that requests for the re-key of Issuing CA Certificates are only submitted by the authorized TrustFactory management personnel.



The TrustFactory PA will verify and validate all the information required in the re-keyed/reissued TrustFactory Client Issuing CA certificate.

### **3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation**

Re-key after revocation is not supported. After a Certificate has been revoked, the Client Issuing CA is required to go through the initial registration process described in Section 4.1 to obtain a new Certificate.

### **3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request**

All revocation requests are authenticated by TrustFactory Client Root CA operations team.

Revocation of an Issuing CA must be approved by the TrustFactory General Manager or PA.



## 4 Certificate Lifecycle Operational Requirements

### 4.1 Certificate Application

#### 4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

The TrustFactory General Manager will submit request to the PA for creation of a new Issuing CA.

#### 4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

The application process requires the following steps:

1. TrustFactory General Manager will complete an application for a Client Issuing CA and submit to the TrustFactory PA.
2. The TrustFactory PA will verify and validate all the information required in the Client Issuing CA certificate.
3. TrustFactory PA may approve or reject the request for a Client Issuing CA certificate.

The enrolment process includes the following steps:

- TrustFactory operations team schedules a key ceremony at the TrustFactory Client Root CA vault to establish the Issuing CA
- Conduct key generation for the new Issuing CA in the Issuing CA HSM
- During the key ceremony, submit a CSR from the Client Issuing CA to the TrustFactory Client Root CA
- The TrustFactory Client Root CA will validate and sign the Client Issuing CA CSR and issue the Issuing CA Certificate
- Install the Client Issuing CA Certificate on the Issuing CA system
- Clone new keys and certificate to backup HSM

### 4.2 Certificate Application Processing

#### 4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The TrustFactory PA will validate that requests for Issuing CA Certificates are only submitted by the authorized TrustFactory management personnel.

Refer to 3.2 above.

#### 4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

TrustFactory PA may approve the request for an Issuing CA certificate, assuming all verification of certificate information has been completed successfully. The TrustFactory PA may reject applications including for the following reasons:

- TrustFactory PA is unable to successfully verify or validate the information to be published on the Client Issuing CA certificate.
- TrustFactory PA may reject requests if there is a potential for negative consequences to TrustFactory's brand, reputation or operations in accepting the request.

TrustFactory PA is under no obligation to provide a reason for rejection of a Certificate Request.

#### 4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

All reasonable methods are used in order to evaluate and process Certificate applications within one month from receipt of completed application.

### 4.3 Certificate Issuance

#### 4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate Issuance



TrustFactory Client Root CA may only accept certificate issuance requests for Client Issuing CAs approved by the TrustFactory PA. The PA will satisfy itself that the information provided to it by the Issuing CA is accurate and that the verification checks have been successfully completed.

After approval by the PA, the TrustFactory GM will arrange for the creation and operation of the new Issuing CA and submit a CSR from the Client Issuing CA to the TrustFactory Client Root CA. The TrustFactory Client Root CA may then generate and digitally sign the Issuing CA Certificate applied for.

The procedure for the TrustFactory Client Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation requires the presence of two trusted roles to perform the procedure.

#### **4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate**

TrustFactory General Manager will provide written confirmation to the PA of issuance of the Issuing CA certificate.

### **4.4 Certificate Acceptance**

#### **4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

After issuance of the Client Issuing CA certificate, the TrustFactory operations team will check that the certificate content is accurate. If there are any inaccuracies then the certificate will be revoked. The Certificate is deemed accepted when the Client Issuing CA starts using the Certificate.

#### **4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

TrustFactory Client Root CA publishes the Certificate by publishing it in a Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

#### **4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

The TrustFactory Policy Authority will be notified whenever an Issuing CA certificate is issued. Notification to other entities is not required.

### **4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

#### **4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

The TrustFactory Client Issuing CA will use its private key and Certificate in strict compliance with this CPS. Private Keys will only be used as specified in the appropriate key usage and extended key usage fields as indicated in the corresponding Certificate.

Refer to certificate profiles in Annexure A.

#### **4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

Relying Parties must verify that the Issuing CA Certificate is valid by examining the CRL provided by TrustFactory Client Root CA before initiating a transaction involving such Certificate.

TrustFactory provides a Relying Party Agreement that Relying Parties should comply with. Relying Parties should check the status of the Client Issuing CA certificate before relying on the certificate and perform a risk assessment to ensure that their reliance is appropriate according to the defined key usage.

### **4.6 Certificate Renewal**

#### **4.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal**

TrustFactory Client Root CA may renew a Certificate under the following criteria:

- The original Certificate to be renewed has not been revoked;





- The Public Key from the original Certificate has not been blacklisted for any reason; and
- All details within the Certificate remain accurate and no new or additional validation is required.

#### **4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal**

The TrustFactory General Manager submits a request to the PA for approval of the renewal of the Issuing CA certificate.

#### **4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests**

TrustFactory PA will validate that requests for renewal of Issuing CA Certificates are only submitted by the authorized TrustFactory management personnel.

The TrustFactory PA will verify and validate all the information required in the renewed TrustFactory SSL Issuing CA certificate.

The certificate renewal is authenticated when the SSL Issuing CA submits a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) signed with its Private Key and the TrustFactory SSL Root CA will validate it with the SSL Issuing CA's public key.

If at any point any Subject name information embodied in a Certificate is to be changed in any way, the TrustFactory PA will validate and approve the change and a new Certificate issued with the validated information.

#### **4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

As per 4.3.2.

#### **4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewed Certificate**

As per 4.4.1.

#### **4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA**

As per 4.4.2.

#### **4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

As per 4.4.3.

### **4.7 Certificate Re-Key**

#### **4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-key**

TrustFactory Client Root CA may re-key a Certificate under the following criteria:

- The original Certificate has not been revoked;
- The Public Key from the original Certificate has not been blacklisted for any reason;
- The Subject details remain the same; and
- The request has been authorized by the PA.

The original Certificate is revoked after the re-key is performed.

#### **4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key**

The TrustFactory General Manager must submit a request to the PA for approval of the re-key of the Issuing CA certificate.

#### **4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests**

For a Re-key, a new CSR must be provided containing the new Public Key.



#### **4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

As per 4.3.2

#### **4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate**

As per 4.4.1

#### **4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA**

As per 4.4.2

#### **4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

As per 4.4.3

### **4.8 Certificate Modification / Re-issue**

#### **4.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification**

TrustFactory Client Root CA may modify/reissue a Certificate under the following criteria:

- The original Certificate has not been revoked;
- The Public Key from the original Certificate has not been blacklisted for any reason;
- The Subject details remain the same; and
- The request has been authorized by the PA.

#### **4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification**

The TrustFactory General Manager should submit a request to the PA for approval of the re-issue of the Issuing CA certificate.

#### **4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests**

For a Modification/Re-issue, a CSR will be provided containing the existing Public Key.

#### **4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

As per 4.3.2

#### **4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed/Reissued Certificate**

As per 4.4.1

#### **4.8.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed/Reissued Certificate by the CA**

As per 4.4.2

#### **4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

As per 4.4.3

### **4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

#### **4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation**

##### **4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate**



Not applicable.

#### 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

Revocation of a Client Issuing CA Certificate will be performed within seven (7) days under the following circumstances as identified by the TrustFactory management team:

1. The TrustFactory General Manager requests revocation in writing;
2. The TrustFactory General Manager notifies the PA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
3. The TrustFactory operations obtains evidence that the Issuing CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6,
4. The TrustFactory operations team obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
5. The TrustFactory operations team is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Issuing CA has not complied with this CPS or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;
6. The TrustFactory operations team determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
7. The Issuing CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;
8. The Issuing CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL; or
9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement.

#### 4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

The TrustFactory management or operations team may request revocation of a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate if there is reasonable cause to revoke the certificate.

Additionally, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports, through the TrustFactory website at [www.trustfactory.net](http://www.trustfactory.net), informing the TrustFactory Client Root CA of reasonable cause to revoke the certificate.

#### 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

TrustFactory operations team will record each request for revocation and authenticate the source, taking appropriate action to revoke the Certificate if the request is authentic and approved. A revocation request to revoke a TrustFactory Issuing CA Certificate will be approved and issued by the TrustFactory PA.

The TrustFactory operations team will generate a CRL signing request for an updated CRL containing the serial number of the Issuing CA Certificate that needs to be revoked, and manually sign the CRL using the offline Client Root CA. Once revoked, the serial number of the Certificate and the date and time will be added to the appropriate CRL. CRL reason codes may be included. CRLs are published according to this CPS.

Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties can report suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates, through the "Report Abuse" link on the TrustFactory website at <https://www.trustfactory.net>.

#### 4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

Revocation requests should be made as soon as reasonably practicable, but not more than 24 hours after confirming the compromise of the Private Key.

#### 4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

TrustFactory operations will begin investigating Certificate Problem Reports within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt of the report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the TrustFactory CA operations team will work with the entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which the CA will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published revocation will not exceed the time frames stipulated in Section 4.9.1.



The date selected for revocation will consider the following criteria:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber;
4. The entity making the complaint; and
5. Relevant legislation.

TrustFactory Client Root CA will revoke Issuing CA certificates as quickly as practical upon receipt of a proper revocation request. Section 4.9.1 states the circumstances under which the revocation request will be processed within 7 days. Revocation requests will be processed before the next CRL is published, excepting those requests received within twelve hours of CRL issuance.

#### **4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties**

Prior to relying upon a Certificate, Relying Parties must validate the suitability of the Certificate to the purpose intended and ensure the Certificate is valid. Relying Parties will need to consult the CRL information for each Certificate in the chain as well as validating that the Certificate chain itself is complete and follows IETF PKIX standards.

#### **4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency**

For the status of Issuing CA Certificates, the TrustFactory Root CA will update and reissue CRLs at least:

- (i) once every twelve months; and
- (ii) within 24 hours after revoking an Issuing CA Certificate; and
- (iii) the value of the nextUpdate field will not be more than twelve months beyond the value of the thisUpdate field.

#### **4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability**

CRLs for Issuing/Subordinate CA revocation information are published in online repositories at: <http://www.trustfactory.net/crl/tf-client-issuing.crl>.

The Root CA will ensure that revocation data for issued Certificates are available through a Repository 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

#### **4.9.10 On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements**

Relying Parties must confirm revocation information otherwise all warranties become void.

#### **4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

The TrustFactory General Manager shall notify the TrustFactory PA of the revocation of an Issuing CA Certificate, and a notice is placed on the Repository.

#### **4.9.12 Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise**

In the event of compromise of a TrustFactory Client Root CA Private Key used to sign Client Issuing CA Certificates, TrustFactory operations will as soon as practically possible inform the Client Issuing CA that the private key may have been Compromised. This includes cases where TrustFactory operations at its own discretion decides that evidence suggests a possible Key Compromise has taken place.

Where Key Compromise is not disputed, TrustFactory Client Root CA will revoke Issuing CA Certificates within 24 hours and publish online updated CRLs within 24 hours of creation.

#### **4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension**

Not Applicable. Certificate suspension is not supported and not permitted.



#### **4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension**

Not applicable. Certificate suspension is not supported and not permitted.

#### **4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request**

Not applicable. Certificate suspension is not supported and not permitted.

#### **4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period**

Not applicable. Certificate suspension is not supported and not permitted.

### **4.10 Certificate Status Services**

#### **4.10.1 Operational Characteristics**

TrustFactory Client Root CA provides a Certificate status service in the form of a CRL distribution point. These services are presented to Relying Parties within the Client Issuing CA Certificate and the URLs to access the CRL are provided in Section 2.2 of this CPS.

Revocation entries on a CRL are not removed until after the Expiry Date of the revoked Certificate.

CRLs are signed by the TrustFactory Client Root CA Private Key.

#### **4.10.2 Service Availability**

The TrustFactory Client Root CA maintains an online 24x7 Repository that relying parties and application software can use to automatically check the current status of all unexpired Certificates issued by the CA.

The TrustFactory maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to respond internally to a high-priority Certificate Problem Report (submitted via the Report Abuse link on the TrustFactory website), and where appropriate, forward such a complaint to law enforcement authorities, and/or revoke a Certificate that is the subject of such a complaint.

#### **4.10.3 Operational Features**

No requirements specified.

### **4.11 End of Subscription**

Subscribers may end their subscription to Certificate services by having their Certificate revoked or naturally letting it expire.

### **4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery**

#### **4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices**

CA Private Keys are never escrowed.

TrustFactory Client Root CA does not offer key escrow services.

#### **4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices**

Not applicable.



## 5 Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

TrustFactory Client Root CA operates under physical and environmental security policies designed to provide reasonable assurance of the detection, deterrence and prevention of unauthorized logical or physical access to CA related facilities.

### 5.1 Physical Controls

#### 5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The TrustFactory CA hardware and software are hosted in a high security caged enclosure (the Vault) within a data center with physical security and access control procedures that meet industry standards. The Vault barriers extend from real floor to real ceiling to prevent unauthorized access. The data center is made of concrete and steel construction.

#### 5.1.2 Physical Access

##### 5.1.2.1 Data Centres

TrustFactory CAs systems operate within secure data centers (vaults) that provide four layers of security to access sensitive hardware. A Closed-Circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance system, with motion activated digital recording is in place for the Vault. Only authorized personnel are allowed into the data center, with TrustFactory personnel accompanying any third party that needs access into the Vault.

Access control is managed via an electronic access control system with biometric access control at the Vault entry/exit points. Two persons are required for access to the Vault. All successful access entry into the Vault is logged.

##### 5.1.2.2 RA Operations Areas

TrustFactory's RA operations are protected against access from non-authorized individuals. Access to the building requires the use of an "access" card. Access card use is logged by the building security system. The TrustFactory offices are equipped with biometric access as well as video cameras. The support and vetting rooms are also access controlled. In the event of remote vetting, the operators make use of two factor authentication and VPN to access the TrustFactory RA software. Access logs and video records are reviewed on a regular basis. TrustFactory securely stores all removable media and paper containing sensitive information related to its CA or RA operations in secure lockers.

#### 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

TrustFactory CAs operate within a secure data center that is equipped with redundant power and cooling system. UPS and failover to power generator are in place in the event of power outage.

#### 5.1.4 Water Exposures

TrustFactory CAs servers are located above ground and placed on raised flooring to protect against water leaks.

Potential water damage from fire prevention and protection measures (e.g., sprinkler systems) are excluded from this requirement.

#### 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

TrustFactory CAs operate within a secure data center that is equipped with a fire detection and suppression system.

#### 5.1.6 Media Storage

TrustFactory CAs ensure that any media used is securely handled to protect it from damage, and unauthorized access. Storage of backup media is kept off-site. All media containing sensitive data is securely disposed of when no longer required. Records are maintained of all removable media across their lifecycle.

Media containing private key material are stored in sealed tamper evident envelopes, within locked containers inside the Vaults.

Records are maintained of all removable media across their lifecycle (first received to destruction).



### 5.1.7 Waste Disposal

TrustFactory CA's ensure that paper documents and magnetic media containing sensitive or confidential information are securely disposed of by:

- in the case of magnetic media:
  - physical damage to, or complete destruction of, the asset;
  - the use of an approved utility to wipe or overwrite magnetic media; and
- in the case of printed material:
  - shredding, or destruction by an approved service.

### 5.1.8 Off-Site Backup

TrustFactory CAs performs routine backups of critical system data, audit log data, and other essential business information. The back-up facilities and procedures ensure that all essential business information, processes and software can be recovered following a disaster or storage media failure.

Back-up and recovery arrangements for individual systems are regularly tested to ensure that business continuity and disaster recovery plans are functional. Backup media are stored at a secure offsite location (at a location separate from the Certificate issuance equipment), with appropriate levels of physical and procedural security controls.

Transportation of backup tapes to/from the offsite storage facility are done using tamper-evident envelopes

Backup and recovery procedures are documented in the TrustFactory operational procedures documents and the disaster recovery plan.

## 5.2 Procedural Controls

### 5.2.1 Trusted Roles

TrustFactory Trusted Persons include all employees, contractors, and consultants that have access to or control authentication and/or cryptographic operations. The trusted roles are distributed such that no single person can circumvent the security of the CA system. The functions performed in these roles form the basis of trust for all uses of the CA.

The operational trusted roles are the roles fulfilling the following functions:

- Validation Specialist / RA Operator:
  - responsible for approving issuance and revoking certificates
  - performs the Applicant/Subscriber information validation and verification duties
- Auditor:
  - reviewing of CA system audit logs
  - performing compliance checking of operational processes against the CP and CPS
- Security Officer:
  - overall responsibility for administering the CA's information security management system policies and processes
  - PKI systems asset management
  - key ceremony: script compliance, protection of key materials
- Systems Administrator:
  - installation, configuration and maintenance of the CA server and network systems
  - monitoring the operational health of CA systems
  - day-to-day operation, backup and recovery of CA systems
  - administration of the server operating systems and network components
  - preparing and physically operating the HSM appliance and related equipment (host server and attached workstations) for the key ceremony
  - installing the server and HSM appliance into the vault after the ceremony
  - Administrative duties on the HSM under a 2-person (dual custody) rule
- CA Administrator:



- CA cryptographic key life cycle management functions
- Setup and configuration of CA software
- overall management and coordination of CA functions

Key Ceremony only trusted roles:

- HSM Administrator
  - administration of HSM under 2 of 3 rule
  - can be a backup/stand-in for the System Administrator with regards to operating the HSM appliance and related equipment
- Shareholder:
  - holder of a key share
- Normal Crypto User:
  - signing operations in key ceremony

Multiple people may hold the same trusted role, with collective privileges sufficient to fill the role. Other trusted roles may be defined in other documents, which describe or impose requirements on the CA operation.

The CA maintain lists, including names, organizations, contact information, and organizational affiliation for those who act in trusted roles and makes them available during compliance audits. The RA maintains lists, including names, organizations, and contact information of those who act in RA Operations Staff, RA Administrators, and RA Security Officer roles for that RA.

### 5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

TrustFactory CAs require multiple persons for critical CA tasks (e.g., Key Pair generation, backup and recovery) so that any malicious activity would require collusion. All participants shall serve in a trusted role as defined in Section 5.2.1 above.

The HSMs define a separation of roles for specific tasks, and in addition, each role requires multi-person control as defined in the table below:

	ADMIN tasks	SHAREHOLDER tasks	USER tasks
Root CAs	2 of 3	3 of 5	1 of 1
Subordinate CAs	2 of 3	2 of 3	1 of 1
Issuing CAs	2 of 3	2 of 3	1 of 1

### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

Before appointing a person to a trusted role, TrustFactory runs a background check for identity verification and criminal records.

For RA systems, trusted roles are authenticated using VPN and two-factor authentication.

For CA systems, smart card authentication is used to authenticate trusted roles.

### 5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

TrustFactory CAs enforce role separation either by the CA equipment or procedurally or by both means. Individual CA personnel are specifically designated to the trusted roles defined in Section 5.2.1 above and it is not permitted for any one person to serve in more than one operational trusted role at the same time.

No individual is assigned more than one identity when accessing CA equipment.

## 5.3 Personnel Controls

### 5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements





TrustFactory CAs employ a sufficient number of personnel that possess the knowledge, experience and qualifications necessary for the offered services, as appropriate to the job function.

Trusted roles and responsibilities are documented in job descriptions. The job descriptions include skills and experience requirements.

Personnel are appointed to become Trusted Persons based on a combination their background, qualifications, training or experience needed to perform their prospective job responsibilities competently and satisfactorily.

Managerial personnel are employed based on having experience or training in electronic signature technology and familiarity with security procedures for personnel with security responsibilities, and experience with information security, sufficient to carry out management functions.

### **5.3.2 Background Check Procedures**

Prior to the engagement of any person in the Certificate Management Process, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor of the TrustFactory CA, TrustFactory verifies the identity and trustworthiness of such person.

All TrustFactory CA personnel in trusted roles shall be free from conflicting interests that might prejudice the impartiality of the CA operations. The TrustFactory CA will not appoint to a trusted role any person who is known to have a conviction for a serious crime or another offence, if such conviction affects his/her suitability for the position.

Persons fulfilling Trusted Roles pass a background check, comprising identity verification and criminal record checks. CAs have a process in place to ensure employees undergo security background checks at least every 5 years.

### **5.3.3 Training Requirements**

Documentation is maintained identifying all personnel who received training and the subject of the training completed.

TrustFactory Validation Specialists are trained on the required tasks before they are allowed to perform their roles. Validation Specialists are required to pass an examination provided by TrustFactory on the information verification requirements outlined in the CPS's, to ensure that they possess the required knowledge and skills.

### **5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

All personnel in Trusted Roles maintain skill levels consistent with the CA's training and performance programs. Individuals in trusted roles are aware of changes in the TrustFactory CA or RA operations, as applicable. Individuals will be retrained when any significant change to the operations is required.

Refresher training shall be conducted as and when required.

### **5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

TrustFactory CAs should ensure that any change in the staff will not affect the operational effectiveness of the service or the security of the system.

### **5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

Appropriate disciplinary sanctions are applied to personnel violating provisions and policies within the CP, CPS or CA related operational procedures.

### **5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements**

Contractor personnel employed in trusted roles are subjected to the same security controls, verification and training processes as permanent CA personnel.

TrustFactory will verify that each Delegated Third Party's personnel involved in the issuance of a Certificate meets the training and skills requirements of Section 5.3.3 and the document retention and event logging requirements of Section 5.4.1.



### 5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

TrustFactory CAs make available this CP, corresponding CPS's, relevant policies, and operational documents to its employees in order for them to perform their duties.

## 5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

### 5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

Audit logs are generated for events relating to the security and services of the CA. Where possible, the audit logs are automatically generated. Where this is not possible, a logbook, signed scripts, paper form, or other physical mechanism is used. The security audit logs, both electronic and non-electronic, will be retained and made available during compliance audits.

TrustFactory Client Root CA logs all events relating to the lifecycle of Certificates.

The TrustFactory Client Root CA records at least the following events:

1. CA key lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction;
    - Withdrawal of keying material from service;
    - Identity of the entity authorizing a key management operation,
    - Identity of entity handling any keying material (such as key components or keys stored in portable devices or media);
    - Compromise of a private key.
  - b. Cryptographic device lifecycle management events:
    - device receipt and installation;
    - placing into or removing a device from storage;
    - device activation and usage;
    - device changes in state of use.
2. CA and Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Certificate requests, renewal, and revocation;
  - b. All verification activities stipulated in this CPS;
  - c. Acceptance and rejection of CA certificate requests by the TrustFactory PA;
  - d. Issuance of Certificates;
  - e. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists.
3. Security events, including:
  - a. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
  - b. PKI and security system actions performed;
  - c. Security profile changes;
  - d. System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
  - e. Entries to and exits from the CA facility.

At a minimum, each audit record includes the following (either recorded automatically or manually) elements:

- Date and time of entry;
- Identity of the person or entity making the journal entry; and
- Description of the entry.

### 5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log

Audit logs of security events on the IT and security infrastructure are reviewed on a weekly basis by the TrustFactory Security Officer, for any evidence of malicious activity. Unauthorized or suspicious activity is investigated.

Any important operation involving the Root CA HSM is conducted through documented CA ceremony scripts which are witnessed by the internal auditors.

### 5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

Audit logs are retained for at least two years, or held for a period of time as appropriate to provide necessary legal evidence in accordance with any applicable legislation.



#### **5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log**

The audit logs are protected in a manner to ensure they cannot be deleted or destroyed (except for transfer to long term media) for the duration of their retention period. Only authorized trusted individuals are able to perform any operations, such as viewing, archiving or transfer to backup media, without modifying integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data. The records of events are date stamped in a secure manner. Digital signatures are used to protect the integrity of audit logs where applicable or required to satisfy legal requirements.

#### **5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures**

Audit logs are backed up using online backup mechanism to the disaster recovery site, and at least once a month they are backed up to tape and taken to a vault for storage.

#### **5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)**

Audit processes are initiated at system start up and continue until system shutdown. The audit collection system ensures the integrity and availability of the data collected. In the case of a problem occurring during the process of the audit collection, the TrustFactory CAs will determine whether to suspend TrustFactory CA operations until the problem is solved, duly informing the impacted users.

#### **5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments**

TrustFactory CAs perform regular vulnerability assessments covering all TrustFactory CA systems related to Certificate issuance products and services.

TrustFactory CAs undergo a penetration test on the CA's Certificate Systems on at least an annual basis and after significant infrastructure or application upgrades or modifications.

TrustFactory requires that each Delegated Third Party (or RA) also perform similar vulnerability assessments and penetration tests on their Certificate systems.

Additionally, the TrustFactory's security program includes an annual Risk Assessment that:

1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that the CA has in place to counter such threats.

### **5.5 Records Archival**

#### **5.5.1 Types of Records Archived**

All records related to auditable events defined in Section 5.4.1 should be archived.

#### **5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive**

The TrustFactory CAs and Delegated Third Parties (or RAs) will retain all documentation relating to certificate requests and the verification thereof, and all Certificates issued and revocation thereof, for at least seven years after any Certificate based on that documentation ceases to be valid.

#### **5.5.3 Protection of Archive**

Archive records are stored at a secure location and are maintained in a manner that prevents unauthorized modification, substitution, or destruction.



#### **5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures**

Archive data is backed up over the network to storage media within the DR data center vault. Backup tape media are then transferred to an offsite storage vault.

#### **5.5.5 Requirements for Timestamping of Records**

Irrespective of timestamping methods, all logs have data indicating the date and time at which the event occurred.

#### **5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)**

All archive records are collected from internal systems and processes.

#### **5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information**

Media storing of TrustFactory CA archive information are checked upon creation. Only authorized TrustFactory CA equipment, trusted roles and other authorized persons are allowed to access the archive.

Requests to obtain archive information shall be coordinated by people in trusted roles (the system administrator, the general manager, and the security officer).

### **5.6 Key Changeover**

Towards the end of the Client Root CA private key's lifetime, in accordance with Section 6.3.2, a new CA signing key pair is commissioned by the TrustFactory PA and all subsequently issued Certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key. Both keys may be concurrently active. Private Keys used to sign previous Client Issuing CA Certificates are maintained until such time as all Client Issuing CA Certificates have expired.

Certificate Subject information may also be modified and Certificate profiles may be altered to adhere to best practices.

The corresponding new Root CA Certificate is provided to Subscribers and relying parties through the online repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

### **5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery**

#### **5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures**

TrustFactory handles incident and compromise according to incident response and management procedures that aim to minimize the impact of such events.

The incident management procedures include an assessment to determine if the CA or RA system needs to be rebuilt, if only some Certificates need to be revoked, and/or if a CA hierarchy needs to be declared as Compromised. Management will determine when it is appropriate to invoke the disaster recovery plan.

TrustFactory has a documented business continuity plan and disaster recovery procedures designed to notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, Subscribers, and Relying Parties in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure. The TrustFactory CAs annually test, review, and updates these procedures.

The business continuity plan includes:

1. The conditions for activating the plan;
2. Emergency procedures;
3. Fallback procedures;
4. Resumption procedures;
5. A maintenance schedule for the plan;
6. Awareness and education requirements;
7. The responsibilities of the individuals;
8. Recovery time objective (RTO);
9. Regular testing of contingency plans.
10. The CA's plan to maintain or restore the CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes;
11. A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;



12. What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time;
13. How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken;
14. The distance of recovery facilities to the CA's main site; and
15. Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster. TrustFactory does not publicly disclose its business continuity plans but make its business continuity plan and security plans available to the CA's auditors upon request.

### **5.7.2 Recovery Procedures if Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted**

TrustFactory CAs have established incident management procedures that outline the steps to be taken if computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted, or compromised.

If any equipment is damaged or rendered inoperative, but the Private Keys are not destroyed, the operation should be re-established as quickly as possible, giving priority to the ability to generate Certificate status information according to the TrustFactory CA's disaster recovery plan.

### **5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures**

In the event a TrustFactory CA Private Key is Compromised, lost, destroyed or suspected to be Compromised, the following procedures shall be followed after investigation of the problem:

1. The trust anchor managers and relying parties, must be notified within 6 hours to remove the self-signed certificates from their trust stores.
2. All the Subscribers who have been issued a Certificate will be notified at the earliest feasible opportunity, but within 24 hours; and
3. If the PKI system can be securely re-established, then new Root CA or Issuing CA certificates shall be generated.

### **5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster**

The TrustFactory operational processes deal with the business continuity for all TrustFactory CAs after a disaster, such as natural disasters, system outages, security incidents and compromise. A disaster recovery (DR) hot-standby site is in place to provide for timely recovery of CA services in the event of a system outage or disaster and provide continuity of operations.

The DR site is a suitable distance away from the production site, so that the DR site is not affected by an external incident which impacts the production site.

Certificate status information systems are deployed so as to provide 24 hours per day, 365 days per year availability.

## **5.8 CA or RA Termination**

In the event of termination of a TrustFactory CA or RA, the TrustFactory CA shall provide 90 days' notice to all customers prior to the termination and certificates will be revoked at the end of the 90-day notice period.

In addition, the CA will:

- Stop delivering Certificates according to and referring to this CP or the relevant CPS;
- Revoke the CA certificates;
- Archive all audit logs and other records prior to termination;
- Destroy all Private Keys upon termination;
- Ensure archive records are transferred to an appropriate authority to be determined at the time by the TrustFactory Policy Authority, such as another TrustFactory CA that delivers identical services;
- Use secure means to notify customers and software platform providers to delete all trust anchors; and
- Notify relevant regulatory authorities that require reporting of termination.



## 6 Technical Security Controls

### 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

#### 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

##### 6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

The signing key pair for the TrustFactory Client Root CA is created during the initial startup of the CA application and is protected by the master keys for the TrustFactory Client Root CA. Hardware key generation is used which is compliant to FIPS 140-2 level 3 and uses FIPS 186-2 key generation techniques.

TrustFactory Client Root CA generates its CA Key Pairs under the following conditions:

1. in a physically secured environment, that has access control;
2. using personnel in trusted roles under the principles of multiple person control and split knowledge,
3. generate the CA keys within a cryptographic module which is certified at least to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or above;
4. log its CA key generation activities;
5. prepares and follows a Key Generation Script; and
6. witnessed by a qualified independent auditor.

##### 6.1.1.2 RA Key Pair Generation

Not applicable.

##### 6.1.1.3 Subscriber Key Pair Generation

Not applicable.

#### 6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

Not applicable.

#### 6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

TrustFactory Client Root CA only accepts Public Keys from TrustFactory Issuing CAs that are delivered to the TrustFactory Client Root CA through a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) as part of the Certificate Issuance process included in a formal key generation ceremony.

#### 6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The TrustFactory Client Root CA ensures that its Public Keys are delivered to Relying Parties in such a way as to prevent substitution attacks.

TrustFactory Client Root CA Public Keys are available via a TrustFactory Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

#### 6.1.5 Key Sizes

The TrustFactory Client Root CA will have a key size of 4096 bit RSA key with Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-256). All new Subordinate CA's will have a minimum key size of 2048-bit RSA.

Certificates meet the following requirements for algorithm type and key size.

Root CA Certificates

Digest algorithm	SHA- 256, SHA-384 or SHA- 512
RSA modulus size (bits)	Minimum 2048 bits and must be divisible by 8
ECC curve	NIST P-256 or P-384



Subordinate CA Certificates

Digest algorithm	SHA- 256, SHA-384 or SHA- 512
RSA modulus size (bits)	Minimum 2048 bits and must be divisible by 8
ECC curve	NIST P-256 or P-384

Subscriber Certificates (including infrastructure certificates)

Digest algorithm	SHA- 256, SHA-384 or SHA- 512
RSA modulus size (bits)	Minimum 2048 bits and must be divisible by 8
ECC curve	NIST P-256 or P-384

**6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking**

TrustFactory Client Root CA generates Key Pairs in accordance with the Baseline Requirements and uses reasonable techniques to validate the suitability of Public Keys presented by the TrustFactory Issuing CAs.

**6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes**

TrustFactory Client Root CA sets key usage and extended key usage limitations of subordinate TrustFactory Issuing CA Certificates via the X.509 v3 Key Usage and Extended Key Usage Fields.

Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates are not used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

1. Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
2. Certificates for Subordinate CAs;
3. Certificates for infrastructure purposes (administrative role certificates, internal CA operational device certificates); and
4. Certificates for CRL verification.

Key Usage or extended key usage for the TrustFactory Client Root CA Certificate and TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate are set as per the profiles defined in Annexure A.

Any other use not specified is prohibited.

**6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

**6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls**

TrustFactory Root and Issuing CAs ensure that all systems signing Certificates and CRLs or generating OCSP responses use FIPS 140-2 level 3 as the minimum level of cryptographic protection.

**6.2.2 Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control**

The CA Private Key activation, use and backup operations require multi-person control as follows:

CA	Shareholder Control	HSM Administrator Control
Root CA	3 of 5	2 of 3
Subordinate CA	2 of 3	2 of 3
Issuing CA	2 of 3	2 of 3

**6.2.3 Private Key Escrow**

TrustFactory Root and Issuing CAs do not escrow CA Private Keys.

**6.2.4 Private Key Backup**

TrustFactory's Private Keys are generated and operated inside a cryptographic module, which has been evaluated to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3. Two backups will be created. One backup will be stored at the primary site and one backup at the DR site.



Key Backups are created as part of the key generation ceremony procedure.

### **6.2.5 Private Key Archival**

Parties other than the TrustFactory Issuing CA shall not archive the Issuing CA Private Keys without authorization by the TrustFactory Policy Authority.

TrustFactory Root and Issuing CAs do not archive Private Keys after expiry.

### **6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module**

All keys are generated by and in a cryptographic module. Private Keys are exported from the cryptographic module into backup tokens only for HSM transfer, offline storage, and backup purposes. The Private Keys are encrypted when transferred out of the module and never exist in plaintext form.

TrustFactory Root and Issuing CA Private Keys are generated, activated and stored in Hardware Security Modules. Private Key transfer into or from a cryptographic module is performed in secure manner under multi-person control.

Private Keys must never exist in plain text outside of a cryptographic module.

### **6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

TrustFactory CAs stores CA Private Keys on at least FIPS 140-2 level 3 Hardware Security Modules. Root Private Keys are stored offline in cryptographic modules or on backup tokens as described in sections 6.2.2., 6.2.4 and 6.2.6. Issuer CA private keys held on hardware cryptographic modules are stored in encrypted form.

### **6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key**

TrustFactory Private Keys are activated according to the specifications of the cryptographic module manufacturer. Subscribers are solely responsible for protecting their Private Keys. Subscribers should use a strong password or equivalent authentication method and should also take measures for the physical protection of their device to prevent use of the device and its associated private key without the Subscriber's authorization.

### **6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key**

When a TrustFactory Root / Issuing CA is no longer operational, its Private Keys are removed from the Hardware Security Module, which is powered down and kept physically secured.

### **6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key**

TrustFactory CA Private Keys are destroyed when they are no longer needed or when the Certificate to which they correspond have expired or are revoked.

TrustFactory CA personnel shall destroy the CA Private Key (including all associated CA secret activation data, as well as backups of Private Keys) by deleting and overwriting the key data via HSM re-initialization or zeroization, or physical destruction with a metal shredder or hammer. Such destruction shall be documented and witnessed.

The TrustFactory PA must authorize any CA Private Key destruction.

### **6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating**

Cryptographic modules are certified to FIPS 140-2 level 3. See Section 6.2.1.

For offline CAs (the TrustFactory Root CAs) the cryptographic hardware is verified on a periodic basis. The hardware is verified by powering up the Root CA HSM and running diagnostics at least once per annum.

## **6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management**

### **6.3.1 Public Key Archival**





TrustFactory Client Root CA archives Public Keys from Certificates.

### **6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods**

TrustFactory Client Root CA Certificates and renewed Certificates have a maximum Validity Period of 30 years.  
TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificates and renewed Certificates have a maximum Validity Period of 15 years.

TrustFactory Client Root CA complies with the Baseline Requirements with respect to the maximum Validity Period.

## **6.4 Activation Data**

### **6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation**

Generation and use of TrustFactory Client Root CA activation data used to activate TrustFactory Client Root CA Private Keys are made during a key ceremony (Refer to Section 6.1.1). Activation data is either generated automatically by the appropriate HSM or in such a way that meets the same needs. It is then delivered to a holder of a share of the key who is a person in a trusted role. The delivery method maintains the confidentiality and the integrity of the activation data.

### **6.4.2 Activation Data Protection**

TrustFactory Client Root CA activation data is protected from disclosure through a combination of cryptographic and physical access control mechanisms. TrustFactory Client Root CA activation data is stored on hardware tokens.

### **6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data**

TrustFactory Client Root CA activation data may only be held by personnel in trusted roles.

## **6.5 Computer Security Controls**

### **6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

Computer security technical requirements are achieved utilizing a combination of hardened system software configurations, operating system security features, malicious code protection on user workstations, firewalls and intrusion prevention systems on the network and physical safeguards.

The TrustFactory CA PKI components include the following functions:

- Require authenticated logins for trusted role;
- Enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance;
- Provide discretionary access control;
- Provide security audit capability (protected integrity);
- Require use of cryptography for session communication.

The computer systems are configured with the minimum of the required accounts and network services enabled.

### **6.5.2 Computer Security Rating**

No stipulation.

## **6.6 Lifecycle Technical Controls**

### **6.6.1 System Development Controls**

The system development controls for the TrustFactory CA are as follows:

- The system software is licensed from the vendor, no development or modification is done by TrustFactory;
- System software is released by the vendor with a crypto hash that can be used to verify the integrity of the software prior to installation. (This requirement does not apply to commercial off-the-shelf hardware or software);
- TrustFactory has a quality assurance process that is applied to all software updates and patches.



- The CA system is implemented and tested in a non-production environment prior to implementation in a production environment;
- No change shall be made to the production environment unless the change has gone through the TrustFactory Change Control process;
- All hardware will be shipped or delivered via controlled methods that provide a continuous chain of accountability, from the purchase location to the operations location; and
- Hardware and software updates are purchased in the same manner as original equipment; and are installed by trusted and trained personnel following defined procedures.

### **6.6.2 Security Management Controls**

The configuration of the TrustFactory CA system as well as any modifications and upgrades are documented and controlled by the TrustFactory CA management. The TrustFactory CA software, when first loaded, is checked as being that supplied from the vendor, with no modifications, and is the version intended for use.

### **6.6.3 Lifecycle Security Controls**

TrustFactory Information Security Management System provides the security policies, standards and processes to ensure a trustworthy secure environment.

Only applications required to perform the CA operations are installed on the equipment and are obtained from trusted sources.

All software used is kept up to date according to vendor requirements.

Anti-virus software running on the workstations is automatically kept up to date.

## **6.7 Network Security Controls**

TrustFactory CA PKI components implement appropriate security measures to protect against denial of service and intrusion attacks. Network security controls include firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, network segmentation, anti-virus software on servers and workstations, system hardening.

Unused network ports and services are turned off.

## **6.8 Time Stamping**

No stipulation.



## 7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

### 7.1 Certificate Profile

Typical content of information published on a TrustFactory Client Issuing CA Certificate may include but is not limited to the following elements of information:

- Serial number
- Signature algorithm
- Signature hash algorithm
- Issuer
- Valid from
- Valid to
- Subject
- Public key
- Basic Constraints
- Key Usage
- Authority Information Access
- Certificate Policies
- CRL Distribution Points
- Extended key usage

Certificate profiles are provided in Annexure A.

#### 7.1.1 Version Number(s)

TrustFactory Client Root CA issues Certificates in compliance with X.509 Version 3.

#### 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

TrustFactory Client Root CA issues Certificates in compliance with RFC 5280 and meets the requirements for Certificate content and extensions as specified in the Baseline Requirements.

##### 7.1.2.1 Root CA Certificate

The following applies to the TrustFactory Client Root CA – the specific content of the fields in the certificate can be found in the profile in Annexure A:

basicConstraints	This extension is set as a critical extension. The cA field is set true.
keyUsage	This extension is set as a critical extension. Bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign are set.
certificatePolicies	This extension is not present.
extendedKeyUsage	This extension is not present.

##### 7.1.2.2 Subordinate CA Certificate

The following applies to the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA – the specific content of the fields in the certificate can be found in the profile in Annexure A:

certificatePolicies	This extension is not set as critical. certificatePolicies:policyIdentifier is populated as per the profile in annexure A.
cRLDistributionPoints	This extension is not set as critical, and it contains the HTTP URL of the CA's CRL service.
authorityInformationAccess	This extension is not set as critical, and it contains the HTTP URL of the Issuing CA's OCSP responder (accessMethod = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1).



basicConstraints	This extension is set as a critical extension. This extension is populated as per the profile in annexure A.
keyUsage	This extension is set as a critical extension. Bit positions for digitalSignature, keyCertSign and cRLSign are set, as per the profile in Annexure A.
extkeyUsage (optional)	This extension is not present.

### 7.1.2.3 Subscriber Certificates

Not applicable.

### 7.1.2.4 All Certificates

All other fields and extensions are set in accordance with RFC 5280. The CA will not issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag, extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not specified in section 7.1.2.

## 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

TrustFactory complies with all the current baseline requirements with regards to this section 7.1.3. including 7.1.3.1 and 7.1.3.2

TrustFactory issues Certificates with algorithms indicated by the following OIDs:

SHA256WithRSAEncryption	{ iso(l) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs(l) pkcs-l(l) 11 }
SHA384WithRSAEncryption	{ iso(l) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs(l) pkcs-l(l) 12 }
SHA512WithRSAEncryption	{ iso(l) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi (113549) pkcs(l) pkcs-l(l) 13 }

TrustFactory does not currently sign Certificates using the RSA with PSS padding.

TrustFactory currently do not have any CAs signing certificates using ECDSA keys.

## 7.1.4 Name Forms

### 7.1.4.1 Issuer Information

TrustFactory Client Root CA issues Certificates with name forms compliant to RFC 5280 and the current baseline requirements stipulated under section 7.1.4.

### 7.1.4.2 Subject Information – Subscriber Certificates

Not applicable.

### 7.1.4.3 Subject Information – Root Certificates and Subordinate CA Certificates

By issuing a Client Issuing CA Certificate, the TrustFactory Client Root CA represents that it followed the procedure set forth in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement to verify that, as of the Certificate's issuance date, all of the Subject Information was accurate.

The following **Subject Distinguished Name Fields** are populated in accordance with profile in Annexure A:

- a. **Certificate Field:** subject:commonName
- b. **Certificate Field:** subject:organizationName
- c. **Certificate Field:** subject:organizationalUnitName
- d. **Certificate Field:** subject:localityName
- e. **Certificate Field:** subject:stateOrProvinceName
- f. **Certificate Field:** subject:countryName

## 7.1.5 Name Constraints

TrustFactory Client Root CA may issue Certificates with name constraints where necessary and mark as critical where necessary.



## 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

### 7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers

No stipulation.

### 7.1.6.2 Root CA Certificates

The TrustFactory Client Root CA Certificate does not contain the certificatePolicies extension.

### 7.1.6.3 Subordinate CA Certificates

TrustFactory Client Issuing CA is an Affiliate of its issuer TrustFactory Client Root CA, and asserts the “anyPolicy” identifier 2.5.29.32.0 to indicate certificate is issued and managed in compliance with the Requirements.

### 7.1.6.4 Subscriber Certificates

Not applicable.

## 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

## 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

No stipulation.

## 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

No stipulation.

## 7.2 CRL Profile

### 7.2.1 Version Number(s)

TrustFactory Client Root CA issues Version 2 CRLs in compliance with RFC 5280. CRLs have the following fields:

<b>Issuer :</b>	CN = TrustFactory Client Root Certificate Authority OU = TrustFactory PKI Operations O = TrustFactory(Pty)Ltd L = Johannesburg S = Gauteng C = ZA
<b>Effective Date :</b>	Date and Time issued
<b>Next Update :</b>	Date and Time of next issue
<b>Signature Algorithm :</b>	sha256RSA
<b>Signature Hash Algorithm :</b>	sha256
<b>Serial Number(s) :</b>	List of revoked serial numbers
<b>Revocation Date :</b>	Date of Revocation

### 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

CRLs have the following extensions:

<b>CRL Number :</b>	Monotonically increasing serial number for each CRL
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<b>Authority Key Identifier :</b>	AKI of the issuing CA for chaining/validation requirements
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### 7.3 OCSP Profile

TrustFactory Client Root CA does not operate an Online Certificate Status Profile (OCSP) responder.

#### 7.3.1 Version Number(s)

Not Applicable.

#### 7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

Not Applicable.



## 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

TrustFactory Client Root CA is audited for compliance to the current applicable version of one or more of the following standards:

- WebTrust for Certification Authorities

### 8.1 Frequency and Circumstances of Assessment

TrustFactory CAs complete a compliance audit to ensure compliance with the WebTrust or SAAA standards identified above (where products and services offered require compliance) via a Qualified Auditor on an annual basis at least.

The audits are divided into an unbroken sequence of audit periods that do not exceed one year in duration.

### 8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

Applicable audits of TrustFactory CAs are performed by a Qualified Auditor. A Qualified Auditor means a natural person, Legal Entity, or group of natural persons or Legal Entities that collectively possess the following qualifications and skills:

- Independence from the subject of the audit;
- The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in an Eligible Audit Scheme such as stipulated in section 8.0 of this document;
- Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function;
- Licensed by WebTrust;
- Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics; and
- Maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one million US dollars in coverage.

### 8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

TrustFactory selects auditor(s)/assessor(s) who are completely independent from the TrustFactory CA.

### 8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The audit meets the requirements of the following audit scheme:

- WebTrust for Certification Authorities
- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security
- CA Browser Forum Baseline requirements
- South African Accreditation Authority – ECT Act Regulations (where applicable)

Authorized RAs that provide Advanced Electronic Signature Certificates are required to be audited for compliance to South African Accreditation Authority requirements.

An audit scheme will be applicable to the TrustFactory CA in the year following the adoption of the updated scheme.

For Delegated Third Parties, which are not Enterprise RAs, the TrustFactory CA shall obtain an audit report, issued under the above auditing standards, that provides an opinion whether the Delegated Third Party's performance complies with either the Delegated Third Party's practice statement or the TrustFactory CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement. If the opinion is that the Delegated Third Party does not comply, then the TrustFactory CA shall not allow the Delegated Third Party to continue performing delegated functions.

### 8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

If presented with a material non-compliance by external auditors, TrustFactory CAs shall create a suitable corrective action plan to remove the deficiency. Corrective action plans which directly affect policy and procedure as dictated by the CP and CPS are referred to the TrustFactory Policy Authority.

If required by the applicable supervisory authority or accrediting body, the material non-compliance and corrective action will be reported to the relevant body.



## 8.6 Communications of Results

Results of the audit are reported to the TrustFactory Policy Authority and also the General Manager for analysis and resolution of any deficiency through a subsequent corrective action plan.

Where required, the results of audits on TrustFactory CAs and authorized RAs are also communicated to the relevant standards bodies (WebTrust or SAAA).

All TrustFactory CA audit reports are also published on the Repository.

## 8.7 Self-Audits

TrustFactory CA monitors adherence to its Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statements and strictly controls its service quality by performing self-audits on at least a quarterly basis against a randomly selected sample of the greater of one certificate or at least two percent of the Certificates issued.





## 9 Other Business and Legal Matters

### 9.1 Fees

#### 9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

TrustFactory charges fees for the issuance, management and renewal the various Certificate products that it offers. Such fees are provided on the TrustFactory website ([www.trustfactory.net](http://www.trustfactory.net)) and presented to Subscribers at the time the service is consumed.

TrustFactory reserves the right to change its fee structure from time to time without prior notice to Subscribers.

#### 9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

TrustFactory reserves the right to charge a fee for access to its databases of issued Certificates.

#### 9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

TrustFactory does not charge a fee for access to its published CRLs or OCSP services as described in the applicable CA's CPS. However, reserves the right to charge a fee for providing customized CRLs, OCSP services, or other value-added services related to revocation and status information services.

#### 9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

TrustFactory CAs reserves the right to charge a fee for other additional services not described in this CP or in a CPS.

#### 9.1.5 Refund Policy

TrustFactory Issuing CAs will cancel and refund, or issue a store credit, for a certificate order upon request by a customer within 30 days of the original purchase. The refund/cancellation request must be made via the Customer's account on the TrustFactory Subscriber Management Portal, or via email to TrustFactory

In the event a certificate is purchased for fraudulent use, the product and associated payment are forfeited and the customer does not qualify for a refund or exchange of any kind. If the certificate was issued, it will be canceled without any notice or permission.

Subscribers who choose to invoke the refund policy will have all respective issued Certificates revoked.

### 9.2 Financial Responsibility

#### 9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

TrustFactory maintains a Professional Indemnity insurance policy to cover claims for damages arising out of an act, error, or omission, unintentional breach of contract, or neglect in issuing or maintaining Certificates.

#### 9.2.2 Other Assets

No stipulation.

#### 9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End Entities

TrustFactory Issuing CAs offer a Warranty Policy published on TrustFactory Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

### 9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information



### **9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information**

TrustFactory CAs will treat personal information provided by Applicants/Subscribers as being confidential information and therefore are subject to protection by TrustFactory CA staff to avoid wrongful public disclosure

### **9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information**

Any information not listed as confidential is considered public information. Published Certificate and revocation data is considered public information

### **9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information**

TrustFactory CAs will protect confidential information. TrustFactory CAs protect confidential information through its information security polices, standards and processes and through training and contracts with employees, agents and contractors.

## **9.4 Privacy of Personal Information**

### **9.4.1 Privacy Plan**

TrustFactory CAs protect personal information in accordance with the TrustFactory Privacy Policy published in the Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

### **9.4.2 Information Treated as Private**

TrustFactory CAs treat all information received from Applicants that is not included in a Certificate or a CRL, as private. This applies to information from unsuccessful Applicants.

### **9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private**

Certificate status information, including reasons for revocation, and any Certificate content is deemed not private.

### **9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information**

TrustFactory CAs PKI participants, including RAs, receiving private information will protect it in accordance with the published Privacy Policy and prevent compromise and disclosure to third parties, whilst ensuring compliance with all local privacy laws in their jurisdiction.

### **9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information**

Personal information is to be used in accordance with this CP, the CPS and the Privacy Policy. TrustFactory CAs include any required consents in the Subscriber Agreement, including permission required for any additional information to be obtained from third parties that may be applicable to the product or service being offered by the TrustFactory CA.

### **9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process**

TrustFactory CAs may disclose private information, subject to applicable privacy laws, in cases where:

- disclosure is necessary in response to subpoenas and search warrants.
- disclosure is necessary in response to judicial, administrative, or other legal process during the discovery process in a civil or administrative action, such as subpoenas, interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents.
- required to do so by law or regulation or order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

### **9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances**

No Stipulation.



## 9.5 Intellectual Property rights

TrustFactory CAs does not knowingly violate the intellectual property rights of third parties. Public and Private Keys remain the property of Subscribers who legitimately hold them. TrustFactory CAs retain ownership of Certificates and revocation information that they issue, however they shall grant permission to reproduce and distribute Certificates on a non-exclusive, royalty free basis, provided that they are reproduced and distributed in full.

Key pairs corresponding to Certificates of CAs and end-user Subscribers are the property of the CAs and end-user Subscribers that are the respective Subjects of these Certificates, regardless of the physical medium within which they are stored and protected, and such persons retain all Intellectual Property Rights in and to these key pairs. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, TrustFactory's root public keys and the root Certificates containing them, including all self-signed Certificates, are the property of TrustFactory. TrustFactory licenses software manufacturers to reproduce such root Certificates to place copies in trustworthy software.

TrustFactory owns all intellectual property rights in and associated with its logos, databases, web sites, digital Certificates, trade names, copyrights, software, processes and systems, training manuals, operating manuals, materials distributed to RA, RA associates, applicants and others as promotional material and any other publication originating from TrustFactory including this CP, and all TrustFactory CA CPS documents.

## 9.6 Representations and Warranties

### 9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

TrustFactory CAs use this CP and applicable Subscriber Agreements to convey legal conditions of usage of issued Certificates to Subscribers and Relying Parties. Participants that may make representations and warranties include TrustFactory CA, RAs, Subscribers, Relying Parties, and any other participants as it might become necessary. All parties including the TrustFactory CA, any RAs and Subscribers warrant the integrity of their respective Private Key(s). If any such party suspects that a Private Key has been Compromised they will immediately notify the appropriate RA.

TrustFactory CA represents and warrants to Certificate Beneficiaries, during the period when the Certificate is valid, TrustFactory CA has complied with its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement in issuing and managing the Certificate:

- **Right to Use Domain Name or IP Address:** That, at the time of issuance, TrustFactory CA implemented a procedure for verifying that the Applicant either had the right to use, or had control of, the Domain Name(s) and IP address(es) listed in the Certificate's Subject field and subjectAltName extension (or, only in the case of Domain Names, was delegated such right or control by someone who had such right to use or control); (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TrustFactory CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (see Section 3.2);
- **Authorization for Certificate:** That, at the time of issuance, TrustFactory CA implemented a procedure for verifying that the Subject authorized the issuance of the Certificate and that the Applicant Representative is authorized to request the Certificate on behalf of the Subject; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TrustFactory CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (see Section 3.2.5);
- **Accuracy of Information:** That, at the time of issuance, TrustFactory CA implemented a procedure for verifying the accuracy of all of the information contained in the Certificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute); (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TrustFactory CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (see Sections 3.2.3, 3.2.3, 3.2.4);
- **No Misleading Information:** That, at the time of issuance, TrustFactory CA implemented a procedure for reducing the likelihood that the information contained in the Certificate's subject:organizationalUnitName attribute would be misleading; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TrustFactory CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (see Sections 3.2.3, 3.2.3, 3.2.4);
- **Identity of Applicant:** That, if the Certificate contains Subject Identity Information, the CA implemented a procedure to verify the identity of the Applicant; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TrustFactory CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (see Sections 3.2.3, 3.2.3, 3.2.4);



- **Subscriber Agreement:** That, if TrustFactory CA and Subscriber are not Affiliates, the Subscriber and CA are parties to a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement that satisfies the Baseline Requirements, or, if TrustFactory CA and Subscriber are Affiliates, the Applicant Representative acknowledged and accepted the Terms of Use (see Section 4.5.1);
- **Status:** That TrustFactory CA maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status (valid or revoked) of all unexpired Certificates; and
- **Revocation:** That TrustFactory CA will revoke the Certificate for any of the reasons specified in its Certificate Policy.
- **Fiduciary relationship:** TrustFactory CAs are not the agents, fiduciaries, trustees, or other representatives of subscribers or relying parties.

### 9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

RAs warrant that:

- Verification and Issuance processes are in compliance with this CP and the relevant TrustFactory CA CPS;
- All information provided to TrustFactory CA does not contain any misleading or false information; and
- All translated material provided by the RA is accurate.
- The RAs are not the agents, fiduciaries, trustees, or other representatives of subscribers or relying parties.
- The RA maintains the ability to ensure:
  - a) the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services;
  - b) the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident;
  - c) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organizational security measures; and
  - d) compliance with applicable data protection legislation.
- It complies with all applicable statutory obligations and liabilities, including legislations governing labour and employment, safety of personnel and property, data protection legislation and taxation.

### 9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

Subscribers and/or Applicants, of end-entity certificates, warrant that:

- Subscriber will provide accurate and complete information at all times to TrustFactory CA, both in the Certificate Request and as otherwise requested by TrustFactory CA in connection with issuance of a Certificate;
- Subscribers and/or Applicant shall take all reasonable measures to assure control of, keep confidential, and properly protect at all times the Private Key to be included in the requested Certificate(s) and any associated activation data or device, e.g. password or token;
- Subscriber shall review and verify the Certificate contents for accuracy;
- For SSL/TLS Certificates, the Subscriber shall install the Certificate only on servers that are accessible at the subjectAltName(s) listed in the Certificate, and use the Certificate solely in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use;
- Subscriber shall (a) promptly request revocation of the certificate, and cease using it and its associated Private Key, if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate; and (b) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate;
- Subscriber shall promptly cease use of Private Key associated with the Public Key in the Certificate upon revocation of that Certificate;



- Subscriber shall respond to TrustFactory CA's instructions concerning Compromise or Certificate misuse within forty-eight (48) hours; and
- Applicant acknowledges and accepts that TrustFactory CA is entitled to revoke the Certificate immediately if the Applicant violates the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use or if TrustFactory CA discovers that the Certificate is being used to enable criminal activities such as phishing attacks, fraud, or the distribution of malware.

For TrustFactory Issuing CA Certificates that are signed by a TrustFactory Root CA the TrustFactory PA will ensure that:

- Information in the Issuing CA Certificate is accurate and complete before publishing it to the Repository;
- All reasonable measures are taken to assure control of, keep confidential, and properly protect at all times the Private Key of the Issuing CA and any associated activation data or device, e.g. password or token;
- The Certificate contents are verified for accuracy;
- The Certificate is used in compliance with all applicable laws and in accordance with this CP and The applicable CA's CPS;
- The Issuing CA Certificate is, within 24 hours, revoked and use of its associated Private Key is terminated, if
  - i. there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Private Key associated with the Public Key included in Certificate; and
  - ii. if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate.

#### **9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

A party relying on a TrustFactory CA's Certificate warrants to:

- Have the technical capability to use Certificates;
- Receive notice of the TrustFactory CA and associated conditions for Relying Parties;
- Validate a TrustFactory CA's Certificate by using Certificate status information (a CRL or OCSP) published by the TrustFactory CA in accordance with the proper Certificate path validation procedure;
- Trust a TrustFactory CA's Certificate only if all information featured on such Certificate can be verified via such a validation procedure as being correct and up to date;
- Rely on a TrustFactory CA's Certificate, only as it may be reasonable under the circumstances; and
- Notify the appropriate TrustFactory CA or RA immediately, if the Relying Party becomes aware of or suspects that a Private Key has been Compromised.

The obligations of the Relying Party, if it is to reasonably rely on a Certificate, are to:

- Verify the validity or revocation of the CA Certificate using current revocation status information as indicated to the Relying Party;
- Take account of any limitations on the usage of the Certificate indicated to the Relying Party either in the Certificate or this CP;
- Take any other precautions prescribed in the TrustFactory CA's Certificate as well as any other policies or terms and conditions made available in the application context a Certificate might be used.

Relying Parties must at all times establish that it is reasonable to rely on a Certificate under the circumstances taking into account circumstances such as the specific application context a Certificate is used in.

Claims, by Relying Parties, of liability for misuse of the certificate on excluded applications will be disallowed and the Relying Party will be notified by email of the disallowance of such claims.

#### **9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**



No stipulation.

## 9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

To the extent permitted by applicable law, TrustFactory CA disclaim all warranties, including any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose, outside the context of the TrustFactory Warranty Policy.

TrustFactory CA does not warrant:

1. the accuracy of any unverifiable piece of information contained in Certificates except as it may be stated in the relevant product description; and
2. the accuracy, authenticity, completeness or fitness of any information contained in, free, test or demo Certificates.

## 9.8 Limitations of Liability

In no event shall TrustFactory CA be liable for any indirect, incidental, special or consequential damages or for any loss of profits, loss of data or other indirect incidental, consequential damages arising from or in connection with the use, delivery, reliance upon, license, performance or non-performance of certificates, digital signatures or any other transactions or services offered or contemplated by this CPS or the relevant CA CP.

In no event shall TrustFactory CA be liable for any acts of God, or other party's responsibilities, or any liability incurred if the fault in the verified information on a certificate is due to fraud or wilful misconduct of the Applicant, or any liability that arises from the usage of a certificate that has not been issued or used in conformance with the TrustFactory CP and CPS, or any liability that arises from security, usability, integrity of products, including hardware and software a Subscriber uses, or Any liability that arises from compromise of a Subscriber's private key.

In no event shall TrustFactory or any resellers or co-marketers, or any subcontractors, distributors, agents, suppliers, employees or directors of any of the foregoing be liable to any applicants, subscribers or relying parties or any other third parties for any losses, costs, liabilities, expenses, damages, claims or settlement amounts arising from or relating to claims of infringement, misappropriation, dilution, unfair competition or any other violation of any patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret or any other intellectual property or any other right of person, entity or organization in any jurisdiction arising from or relating to any certificate issues by a TrustFactory CA or arising from or relating to any services provided in relation to a certificate issued by a TrustFactory CA.

To the extent TrustFactory CA has issued and managed the certificate in accordance with this CPS and the relevant CA CP, TrustFactory CA shall not be liable to the subscriber, relying party or any third parties for any losses suffered as a result of use or reliance on such certificate. Otherwise outside of the context of the TrustFactory warranty policy, the TrustFactory CA's liability to the subscriber, relying party or any third parties for any such losses shall in no event exceed the cost of the certificate.

This liability cap limits damages recoverable outside of the context of the TrustFactory warranty policy. Amounts paid under the warranty policy are subject to their own liability caps.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of Subscribers shall be as set forth in the applicable Subscriber agreements. The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of enterprise RA's and the applicable CA shall be set out in the agreement(s) between them.

The liability (and/or limitation thereof) of Relying Parties shall be as set forth in the applicable Relying Party Agreements.

## 9.9 Indemnities

### 9.9.1 Indemnification by TrustFactory CA

Notwithstanding any limitations on its liability to Subscribers and Relying Parties, the TrustFactory CA understands and acknowledges that the Application Software Suppliers who have a Root Certificate distribution agreement in place with the TrustFactory Root CA do not assume any obligation or potential liability of the TrustFactory CA under these Requirements or that otherwise might exist because of the issuance or maintenance of Certificates or reliance thereon by Relying Parties or others.



TrustFactory CA shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless each Application Software Supplier for any and all claims, damages, and losses suffered by such Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by the TrustFactory CA, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved.

This does not apply, however, to any claim, damages, or loss suffered by such Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by the TrustFactory CA where such claim, damage, or loss was directly caused by such Application Software Supplier's software displaying as not trustworthy a Certificate that is still valid, or displaying as trustworthy: (1) a Certificate that has expired, or (2) a Certificate that has been revoked (but only in cases where the revocation status is currently available from the TrustFactory CA online, and the application software either failed to check such status or ignored an indication of revoked status).

### **9.9.2 Indemnification by Subscribers**

To the extent permitted by law, each Subscriber shall indemnify TrustFactory CA, its partners, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to (i) any misrepresentation or omission of material fact by Subscriber, regardless of whether the misrepresentation or omission was intentional or unintentional; (ii) Subscriber's breach of the Subscriber Agreement, this CPS, or applicable law; (iii) the Compromise or unauthorized use of a Certificate or Private Key caused by the Subscriber's negligence; or (iv) Subscriber's misuse of the Certificate or Private Key.

### **9.9.3 Indemnification by Relying Parties**

To the extent permitted by law, each Relying Party shall indemnify TrustFactory CA, its partners, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and contractors against any loss, damage, or expense, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to the Relying Party's (i) breach of the Relying Party Agreement, this CPS, or applicable law; (ii) unreasonable reliance on a Certificate; or (iii) failure to check the Certificate's status prior to use.

## **9.10 Term and Termination**

### **9.10.1 Term**

This CPS remains in force until such time as communicated otherwise by TrustFactory CA on its web site or Repository.

### **9.10.2 Termination**

The TrustFactory CP and CPSs as amended from time to time shall remain in force until they are replaced by a new version. Notified changes are appropriately marked by an indicated version. See Section 9.12 for Amendments procedures and notification.

### **9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival**

TrustFactory CAs will communicate the conditions and effect of termination of this CP and any of their Root CAs CPS's or Issuing CAs CPS's via their Repository.

## **9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants**

TrustFactory accepts notices related to this CP and any of its Root CAs CPS's or Issuing CAs CPS's by means of digitally signed messages or in paper form. Upon receipt of a valid, digitally signed acknowledgment of receipt from TrustFactory CA the sender of the notice deems its communication effective. The sender must receive such acknowledgment within twenty (20) business days, or else written notice must then be sent in paper form through a courier service that confirms delivery or via certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed as follows.

Individuals communications made to TrustFactory must be addressed to email [info@trustfactory.net](mailto:info@trustfactory.net) or by post to TrustFactory in the address provided in Section 1.5.2.

## **9.12 Amendments**

With respect to any amendments impacting Advanced Electronic Signature certificates, significant changes are defined as changes that impact on the:



- identification process
- reliance limits of certificates
- key generation, storage and usage

In compliance with the regulations of the ECT Act in relation to Advanced Electronic Signature certificates, TrustFactory will submit a notification of the significant changes and updated edition in writing to the South African Accreditation Authority at least 30 days prior to the changes taking effect.

#### **9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment**

The TrustFactory Policy Authority will review and approve any amendments to this CP or a CA's CPS. For changes deemed to have significant impact on the TrustFactory CA's users, an updated edition of this CP or a CA's CPS will be published to the TrustFactory Repository within ten days of being approved by the PA.

Revisions not denoted "significant" are those deemed by the TrustFactory Policy Authority to have minimal or no impact (such as clerical changes) on Subscribers and relying parties using Certificates and CRLs issued by a TrustFactory CA. Such revisions may be made without notice to users of this CP or a CA's CPS and without changing the version number of the CP / CPS.

The TrustFactory Policy Authority has the sole authority to determine whether an amendment to the CP / CPS requires a version numbering change.

Controls are in place to reasonably ensure that the CP / CPS is not amended and published without the prior authorization of the TrustFactory Policy Authority.

The updated CP or CPS is published in the TrustFactory Repository at <https://www.trustfactory.net/repository>.

#### **9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period**

TrustFactory PA provides notice of an amendment to this CP or a CA's CPS by posting the revised CP / CPS to the Repository on the TrustFactory website. Following publication of the amended CP and CPS, changes become effective and are deemed accepted immediately upon publication, except where a specific notification period is required by a regulatory body then a notice will be placed on the Repository stating the date by when the revised CP or CPS is deemed accepted and effective.

With specific regard to the TrustFactory Client Issuing CA CPS, changes will be notified to the SAAA at least 30 days prior to implementation, and the changes are deemed accepted and effective 30 days after publishing the CPS to the Repository.

#### **9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed**

The TrustFactory Policy Authority has the sole authority to determine whether an amendment to the CP / CPS requires an OID change.

### **9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions**

Where contractual agreements are in place with third parties, the dispute shall be resolved pursuant to provisions in the contractual agreements.

For disputes arising under, in connection with or relating to this CP or a TrustFactory CPS, complaining parties agree to notify TrustFactory of the dispute in an effort to seek dispute resolution, before resorting to any other resolution mechanism including adjudication, mini-trial, arbitration, binding expert's advice, co-operation monitoring and normal expert's advice. The Parties shall, at the first instance, attempt to resolve all disputes through discussion in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation. TrustFactory management will respond to a formal dispute notice within 30 days.

In the event of failure to mutually resolve the dispute, the dispute shall be referred to arbitration or an Independent Technical Expert (if the dispute is of a technical nature). The Arbitrator or Independent Technical Expert shall be chosen by the parties by mutual agreement. If the Parties cannot agree on an Arbitrator or Independent Technical Expert, then the dispute shall be finally resolved in accordance with the rules of the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa applicable to international arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the Foundation. In the event that the parties do not agree to the seat, the Foundation will select the seat of the arbitration.





The decision of such an arbitrator shall be binding on the partners.

## 9.14 Governing Law

Subject to any limits appearing in applicable law, the laws of the Republic of South Africa shall govern the enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of this CP and of all TrustFactory CA CPSs, irrespective of contract or other choice of law provisions. This choice of law is made to ensure uniform procedures and interpretation for all participants, no matter where they are located.

Each party, including TrustFactory CA partners, Subscribers and Relying Parties, irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of the district courts of Gauteng, South Africa.

## 9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

TrustFactory complies with applicable laws of the Republic of South Africa.

Export of certain types of software used in certain TrustFactory CA public Certificate management products and services may require the approval of appropriate public or private authorities. Parties (including TrustFactory CAs, Subscribers and Relying Parties) agree to comply with applicable export laws and regulations as pertaining in Republic of South Africa.

## 9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

### 9.16.1 Entire Agreement

The TrustFactory CA will contractually obligate every CA and RA involved with Certificate issuance to comply with this CPS. No third party may rely on or bring action to enforce any such agreement.

### 9.16.2 Assignment

Entities operating under this CPS must not assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of TrustFactory.

Where TrustFactory has provided written consent to assign rights and obligations detailed in this CP and an associated TrustFactory CA CPS (including as a result of merger or a transfer of a controlling interest in voting securities), such assignment should be undertaken consistent with this CP articles on termination or cessation of operations, and provided that such assignment does not effect a novation of any other debts or obligations the assigning party owes to other parties at the time of such assignment.

This CPS shall be binding upon the successors, executors, heirs, representatives, administrators, and assigns, whether express, implied, or apparent, of the parties.

### 9.16.3 Severability

If any provision of this CPS, including limitation of liability clauses, is found to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this CPS will be interpreted in such manner as to effect the original intention of the parties.

### 9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorney's Fees and Waiver of Rights)

TrustFactory may seek indemnification and attorneys' fees from a party for damages, losses and expenses related to that party's conduct. TrustFactory's failure to enforce a provision of this CPS does not waive TrustFactory's right to enforce the same provisions later or right to enforce any other provisions of this CPS. To be effective any waivers must be in writing and signed by TrustFactory.

### 9.16.5 Force Majeure

TrustFactory is not liable for any delay or failure to perform an obligation under this CPS to the extent that the delay or failure is caused by an occurrence beyond TrustFactory's reasonable control. The operation of the Internet is beyond TrustFactory's reasonable control.



To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall include a force majeure clause protecting TrustFactory.

### **9.17 Other Provisions**

TrustFactory is subject to the jurisdiction and regulatory framework of the Republic of South Africa. TrustFactory's CA infrastructure is based in South Africa. TrustFactory's sales offices and/or strategic partners have no access to any part of TrustFactory's CA infrastructure. TrustFactory will use all reasonable legal defense against being compelled by a third party to issue Certificates in violation of this CP and associated TrustFactory CA CPS.



## 10 Annexure A: Client CA Certificate Profiles

### 10.1 TrustFactory Client Root CA – Certificate Profile

V1 Fields	
Version	V3
Serial number	
Signature algorithm	sha256RSA
Signature hash algorithm	sha256
Issuer	CN = TrustFactory Client Root Certificate Authority OU = TrustFactory PKI Operations O = TrustFactory(Pty)Ltd L = Johannesburg S = Gauteng C = ZA
Validity	30 years
Subject	CN = TrustFactory Client Root Certificate Authority OU = TrustFactory PKI Operations O = TrustFactory(Pty)Ltd L = Johannesburg S = Gauteng C = ZA
Public key	RSA (4096 bits)
Critical Extensions	
Basic Constraints	Subject Type=CA Path Length Constraint=None
Key Usage	Certificate Signing Off-line CRL Signing CRL Signing
Extensions	
Properties	
Thumbprint algorithm	SHA1



## 10.2 TrustFactory Client Issuing CA – Certificate Profile

V1 Fields	
Version	V3
Serial number	
Signature algorithm	sha256RSA
Signature hash algorithm	sha256
Issuer	CN = TrustFactory Client Root Certificate Authority OU = TrustFactory PKI Operations O = TrustFactory(Pty)Ltd L = Johannesburg S = Gauteng C = ZA
Validity	15 years
Subject	CN = TrustFactory Client Issuing Certificate Authority OU = TrustFactory PKI Operations O = TrustFactory(Pty)Ltd L = Johannesburg S = Gauteng C = ZA
Public key	RSA (4096 bits)
Critical Extensions	
Basic Constraints	Subject Type=CA Path Length Constraint=0
Key Usage	Digital Signature Certificate Signing Off-line CRL Signing CRL Signing
Extensions	
Authority Information Access	[1]Authority Info Access Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) Alternative Name: URL=http://ocsp.trustfactory.net/tf-client-issuing
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.50318.1 [1,1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: https://www.trustfactory.net/repository
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point Distribution Point Name: Full Name: URL=http://www.trustfactory.net/crl/tf-client-issuing.crl
Properties	
Thumbprint algorithm	SHA1